PrivHab+ : A secure geographic routing protocol for DTN by Sánchez Carmona, Adrián et al.
This is the accepted version of the following article: Sánchez Carmona, Adrián; Robles Martínez, 
Sergi; Borrego Iglesias, Carlos. PrivHab+: A secure geographic routing protocol for DTN. 
Computer Communications, 78:2016, p. 56-73, which has been published in final form at 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2015.10.002  
 © 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 
license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
PrivHab+: a Secure Geographic Routing Protocol for DTN
Adria´n Sa´nchez-Carmonaa,∗, Sergi Roblesa, Carlos Borregoa
aDepartment of Information and Communications Engineering (dEIC),
Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona,
08193 Bellaterra, Spain
Abstract
We present PrivHab+, a secure geographic routing protocol that learns about the mobility habits of the nodes of the
network and uses this information in a secure manner. PrivHab+ is designed to operate in areas that lack of network,
using the store-carry-and-forward approach. PrivHab+ compares nodes and chooses the best choice to carry messages
towards a known geographical location. To achieve a high performance and low overhead, PrivHab+ uses information
about the usual whereabouts of the nodes to make optimal routing decisions. PrivHab+ makes use of cryptographic
techniques from secure multi-party computation to preserve nodes’ privacy while taking routing decisions. The overhead
introduced by PrivHab+ is evaluated using a proof-of-concept implementation, and its performance is studied under
the scope of a realistic application of podcast distribution. PrivHab+ is compared, through simulation, with a set of
well-known delay-tolerant routing algorithms in two different scenarios of remote rural areas.
1. Introduction and Motivation
Many initiatives have been implemented to improve
the life conditions of people living in developing countries
by universalizing the access to knowledge and information.
These applications usually target rural areas and are very
likely to deal with challenges like a sparse population, and
a lack of data communication networks.
The need of infrastructure constrains the reach of these
applications, because they cannot operate in regions lack-
ing it. It happens that regions where the communication
networks are unavailable or spotty, are usually the ones
where these services would be more needed and valuable.
Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN), based on the store-
carry-and-forward strategy, is designed to operate in these
challenged scenarios. DTN deals with the abscence of si-
multaneous end-to-end paths [? ] through the usage of
mobile devices that opportunistically establish contact and
exchange messages between them.
Routing protocols designed to operate in DTN scenar-
ios usually generate and use information about node be-
haviors, as the historic of contacts established with each
other node [? ]. Then, they share this information with
neighbours in order to improve the decision making [? ].
Moreover, in some cases, a node is linked to a person, e.
g. because it is carried in a pocket or backpack [? ], or
because they travel in the same vehicle. Therefore, the
information that routing protocols use and share can be
seen as private information about people’s whereabouts or
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frequent behaviors. The more accurate and sensitive this
information is, the more useful it is for the routing pro-
tocol, the more important is to protect its privacy [? ].
Accordingly, a protocol that protects the privacy of this
information expands the amount of scenarios where it can
be used [? ].
Our main contributions are summarized below:
• We introduce the concept of node’s habitat, the area
where a node is more likely to be found. The habi-
tat is built by exploiting the life-cycles of the network
users. It is a very useful tool for making routing deci-
sions by comparing two nodes’ habitats and selecting
the best choice to deliver a message to its destina-
tion. We use an elliptic model of habitat to allow
devices of small capabilities to work and to operate
with it.
• We define PrivHab+, a novel DTN secure geograph-
ical routing protocol designed to operate in areas
without network infrastructure. PrivHab+ uses the
learnt information about the usual whereabouts of
the nodes to find the best neighbour to carry the
messages. PrivHab+ protects node’s privacy by cryp-
tographically protecting this information to avoid its
disclosure.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, reviews the state of the art and provides a de-
scription about some related work of Geographical Rout-
ing Protocols, Secure Routing Protocols and Social-based
Routing Protocols. In Section 3, we present the habitat,
a useful information to compare nodes while routing mes-
sages. We explain how it is modelled and updated. Later,
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we introduce the concepts of homomorphic cryptography
and Taxicab geometry, both needed to preserve nodes’ pri-
vacy while routing using the habitat. In Section 4, we
present PrivHab+, a routing protocol that uses the habi-
tats of the nodes to route messages while preserving the
privacy of the nodes of the network. In Section 5, we
analyse the knowledge obtained by each participant of the
protocol and we reason about the privacy that PrivHab+
provides. In Section 6, we present the proof-of-concept we
have implemented, and we use it to measure the perfor-
mance of PrivHab+. In Section 7, we expose the results
of the simulations that compare PrivHab+ with a set of
well-known DTN routing protocols. Finally, Section 8 con-
cludes this paper.
2. Related Work
In this section, we provide the reader with a review
of the related work. First, we present the state of the
art of Geographical Routing Protocols. Later, we anal-
yse the different proposals of Secure Routing Protocols in
Delay Tolerant Networks. Then, we review some Social-
based Routing Protocols that are related, somehow, to our
proposal. Finally, we provide some conclusions about the
study of the state of the art.
2.1. Geographical Routing Protocols
Geographical Routing Protocols have been studied both
in Ad-hoc Networks and Delay Tolerant Networks. Most
protocols, like GPSR [? ] a protocol with support to
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), always forward pack-
ets to the next hop that is geographically closest to the
destination at the moment of the transmission. This ap-
proach becomes non useful when nodes cannot form a si-
multaneous path towards the destination and have to carry
the packet until the next encounter. Besides, GPSR only
takes into account the position of the nodes at the mo-
ment of the transmission, but not their movement. In [?
], GPSR is modified to adapt it to DTN by being energy-
efficient. However, messages are routed in the basis of a
neighbourhood table that does not adapt well to a sce-
narios where the topology of the network changes quickly.
Using LAROD [? ], nodes forward packets to neighbours
inside a certain area located between the forwarder and
the destination, without taking into account the mobility
patterns of these nodes. In [? ], a Location Service called
LoDIS is presented to improve LAROD by using gossip-
based techniques to update the location of the destination
at each hop. Using LoDIS, the performance of the routing
is greatly improved, but the privacy of all nodes results
heavily damaged because their locations and speed vec-
tors are periodically broadcasted. Moreover, LoDIS uses
the speed vector of the nodes to predict their short-term
future locations. This model loses precision in networks
where the latencies are big due to a low level of connec-
tivity, or because the packets travel big distances before
reaching their destination. MoVe [? ] is a routing proto-
col designed to work in Vehicular Networks where nodes
forward messages to a neighbour if the neighbour is ex-
pected to come closer to the destination. In MoVe, nodes
exchange information to determine whether the message
shall be forwarded. Nodes use the speed vectors to make
routing decisions. This information is not protected and
does not take into account the recent past to infer rou-
tines or typical movement patterns. GeoDTN+Nav [? ]
is designed for routing in a network of streets, and it has
three forwarding modes. In the DTN mode, it requires the
nodes to know where they are heading. This requirement
can be easily met by certain types of vehicles, like buses
or taxis, but it is not reasonable with other types of nodes
(e.g. nodes carried by walking people).
2.2. Secure Routing Protocols
Most secure Routing Protocols aim to protect the rout-
ing algorithm’s performance against malicious behaviours
[? ]. By design, it supposes that nodes voluntarily share
any intimate information (battery level, state of the buffer,
current location, speed vector, most visited places, past
encounters with neighbours, etc.) for the good of the net-
work. These protocols usually consider that the only thing
that has to be protected is the performance of the net-
work. Besides, some secure routing protocols, as SEAD
[? ], provide end-to-end security services to the contents
of the messages, such as integrity, authentication, non-
repudiation or confidentiality. Unfortunately, there are
little proposals of routing algorithms that respect and pro-
tect the privacy of all the nodes that form the network. A
system called ALAR, presented in [? ], allows a source to
send a message through a DTN without revealing its phys-
ical location and proposes an anti-localization routing pro-
tocol. However, the only information that ALAR protects
is the location where the source was when the message
was sent. This proposal is incomplete because it only pro-
tects one concrete information. However, it proves that,
in certain scenarios, nodes are unwilling to share all their
information for the good of the network. For this reason,
nodes privacy has to be protected. In Ad-hoc Networks,
there is a mechanism designed to protect the privacy of
the nodes. Pseudonym generators such as [? ? ] pro-
vide anonymity to the nodes of the network by breaking
the relation between nodes and identifiers. This way, an
observer can not gather enough information to learn the
behaviour of a node. Pseudonyms change over time, and
it is difficult to relate the new ones with the past ones.
However, these mechanisms are not compatible with rout-
ing protocols where nodes need to share information with
their neighbourhood. Hence, the usage of one of these
mechanisms indirectly decreases the performance of the
network, because they restrict the routing protocols that
can be used. Some mechanisms, as the one presented in [?
], only protect, by design, the identities of the sender and
the receiver of the message. Other secure routing proto-
cols for Ad-hoc Networks, as the one presented in [? ] and
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[? ], are based on symmetric key cryptography or hash
functions, and on source routing or distance vector proto-
cols. This approach is unsuitable for DTN. An anonymous
communication solution for DTN has been presented in [?
], but it is designed to hide the identity of the nodes, not
to protect the private information that these nodes use to
make routing decisions.
2.3. Social-based Routing Protocols
There are some Social-based Routing Protocols that
are related, somehow, to the present work. Social-based
routing protocols are based on the idea of using the recent
past to model the behaviour of a node and predict how it
will behave in the near future. BUBBLE RAP [? ] clas-
sifies nodes using their popularity inside their community.
Then, messages are forwarded to more popular nodes until
they reach the community of the destination. Its design
is not good to send messages to hop-distant destinations
because locations are not considered. So, during the first
hops messages can be carried into the opposite direction
of their destination while they are forwarded to more pop-
ular nodes. MobySpace [? ] leverages the life-cycles of
the nodes to track what points of interest are more visited
by every node. These life-cycles are modelled this using
a multi-dimensional probability vector, and messages are
forwarded to nodes with a vector closer to the one of the
destination. The classic euclidean distance is used to mea-
sure the distance between vectors. This is a very interest-
ing approach to our concept of habitat, but lacks adapt-
ability. In MobySpace, the points of interest have to be
defined a priori by an external agent, and some infrastruc-
ture is needed to allow nodes to detect if they are close or
not to one of these points. Besides, MobySpace may lead
to situations where a node that spends most of the time
at point A, very close to B, is considered a bad choice
because the destination is expected to be on B, without
taking into account that A is near B. SANE [? ] uses
these same principles but defines the points of interest in
a very broad sense, allowing the usage of more abstract
concepts, and substitutes the euclidean distance by a met-
ric called “cosine similarity”. HiBOp [? ] extends this
approach using any contextual information about nodes
to make routing decisions. One of its drawbacks is the big
amount of memory needed to store information about ev-
ery contact. Besides, the authors do not explain how this
contextual information can be updated as the behaviours
of the nodes change. In [? ], a general framework called
CAR is presented. CAR goes one step further and not only
uses the recent past to model the behaviour of a node, but
it also tries to predict the future values of the attributes
that define the context. However, all predictions are fi-
nally condensed in a single value, the probability of de-
livery. This probability is used to decide the node where
every message is forwarded. This system is only useful
to calculate the probability of delivery to known nodes.
But it has limitations in scenarios with hop-distant des-
tinations, where the first forwarders do not know almost
anything about the destination because they never met
before. CSI [? ] models the spatio-temporal behaviours
of the nodes using behavioral profiles, and forwards one-to-
many messages through the nodes that are more similar to
the destinations. Besides, the authors realize the impor-
tance of the privacy of the nodes and present a privacy-
preserving mode of operation. This way the protocol can
operate in scenarios where nodes are not willing to send
its behavioural profiles to other nodes when needed.
Unfortunately, although at [? ] the authors recognize
that privacy is an important issue to consider and that
more work is needed to solve it, [? ] is the only one
proposal that takes into account the privacy of the nodes.
In all other cases, nodes are expected to broadcast their
information about the locations they visit or the details
about their interests to the neighbours.
2.4. Summary
Geographical Routing Protocols are a common routing
solution to Delay Tolerant Networks, but almost all pro-
posals use contemporaneous information and short-term
predictions, so they fail to take into account long-term
trends of nodes’ mobility. However, in scenarios where the
distances to travel are big, and the density of nodes is low,
it is more valuable to know where a node will go in the
next hours than where it is currently headed [? ? ].
The existence of several Secure Routing Protocols that
protect the privacy of the nodes, even if they are limited,
proves that in DTN we cannot assume that nodes are will-
ing to share any information for the good of the network.
Given the impact of routing protocols on the performance
of the network, and taking into account the sensitivity of
the information they use, the fact that there are no routing
protocols that protect this information is a surprise.
To our knowledge, this work is the very first proposal
that combines these two fields in a Secure Geographical
Routing Protocol for DTN that uses and at the same time
protects participants’ private information.
Finally, our contributions, both the habitat as a model
of nodes’ behaviours and the protocol used to compare
it, could fit, after some adaptation, in a variety of frame-
works. For example, in some of the Social-based protocols
reviewed, or in Haggle [? ], a more general one. Note that
this only refers to a lower level, to the way nodes store and
exchange information. For the sake of simplicity, we will
consider a Bundle-based DTN [? ] during the rest of this
article.
3. A habitat-based routing protocol
In this section, we explain how routing protocols need
to compare nodes to make decisions, and we present the
tools that PrivHab+ will use. We introduce the habitat
concept. Then, we show how we model it using an ellipse,
how we automatically calculate it and the parameters in-
volved in the calculations. We explain the meaning of the
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different parameters and how to use them. Then we anal-
yse how we can use additive homomorphic cryptography
to compare habitats while preserving the privacy of their
owners, and the drawbacks of this approach. Finally, we
explain how to solve these drawbacks by simply changing
the usual Euclidean geometry by the Taxicab geometry.
3.1. Comparing nodes to route messages
DTN operation is based on opportunistic, usually un-
predictable, contacts between pairs. Each time two or
more nodes come close enough to be within communica-
tion range, an opportunity arises: messages can be for-
warded between them in order to improve their probabil-
ities of reaching their destination. At this moment, the
routing protocol has to decide what messages must be re-
layed to what nodes. In fact, the quality of routing proto-
cols depends on the decision they make1. The core of this
decision-making process is an elemental operation, a com-
parison: given a node carrying a message and one neigh-
bour, compare the two nodes to decide who is a better
choice to carry the message towards its destination. Each
time a routing protocol performs a comparison whose re-
sult is mistaken, a message will be relayed to a node that is
less likely to deliver it to its destination than the previous
one. This leads to a decrease of the performance of the
network.
Our proposal solves the routing problem by comparing
nodes using their habitat, a novel concept that takes ad-
vantage of the routine and the life-cycles of the nodes, to
make routing decisions.
3.2. A model of habitat
In a DTN, nodes may be carried by people, placed on
any form of vehicle, located in a static known place, etc.
Regardless of the type of the carrier, it is very likely that
their mobility pattern becomes routine. For example, a
static node will obviously remain immobile; a node carried
by a person will probably spend a lot of time in the vicinity
of the carrier’s home or workplace; a node placed on a bus
will pass over and over by the same points of their route;
and a node placed on a taxi will usually be inside a certain
area. We can benefit on this to predict the areas they will
visit on the future based on the areas they visited on the
past.
This implies that every node has an habitat, the area
where the node is more likely to be found. Figure 1 shows
a heatmap, the most usual representation of a habitat.
The heatmap contains the information of the areas where
a node spends more time. It is obvious that a being with
a habitat like the one presented in the figure can be found,
1The quality of a routing protocol also depends on the forwarding
policy. This policy is used to decide if multiple copies of a single
message are created, and if the nodes keep a message after they
forwarded it. We provide more discussion about this topic at the
end of Section 4.
Figure 1: Example of habitat represented with a heatmap. The
darker the colour used to depict an area, the more frequently visited
it is.
eventually, in a location where he has not been never be-
fore. However, it will be far more likely to found him in the
darker areas, where he has been repeatedly in the recent
past. PrivHab+ makes use of this logic. This proposal is
the very first approach that makes use of this concept to
design a Geographical Routing Algorithm.
Therefore, we propose a system for location-aware nodes
equipped with a navigation system to periodically obtain
and use their location to update their habitat. For exam-
ple, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers are rela-
tively inexpensive and lightweight, so it is reasonable to
assume that all devices in the network could be equipped
with one. We propose to use a relatively simple model
of habitat to allow nodes to calculate it consuming the
minimum energy and computational resources, and to op-
erate quickly with it to make routing decisions. We model
each habitat using an ellipse because it is simple enough
to achieve an efficient protocol. Moreover, the ellipse can
represent with precision far more shapes than other con-
sidered models, as the circle, the square or the rectangle2.
Additionally, the usage of a simple geometric shape allows
nodes to calculate their habitat using a mobile average,
this way we avoid the need for maintaining a historic of
past locations.
3.3. Definition and update of the elliptic habitat
We model each habitat H using an ellipse3. Therefore,
each habitat is defined by three characteristics: two focal
points and a radius. From now on, we will refer as F1 =
(x1, y1) and F2 = (x2, y2) to the two focal points of the
habitat and we will use r to denote their radius.
We assume that every geographic coordinate (a pair
latitude - longitude) can be mapped4 to cartesian coor-
dinates (x, y) and that this mapping is known by all the
2Besides, in Taxicab geometry (it will be explained below), both
the circle, the square and the rectangle are specific types of ellipses.
So using the generalisation, the ellipse, we provide the tools needed
to use any of these models.
3Definition: the set of points such that the distance from any
point in that set to a given point called focus plus the distance from
that point to the other focus is equal to the ellipse’s radius
4Any cartographic projection can be used.
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nodes of the network. With a frequency of ω updates/hour,
all nodes obtain their location L = (x, y), and use an
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) to up-
date their habitat. The habitat H = (F1, F2, r) is up-
dated using the previous version of the habitat Hold =
(F1old, F2old, rold) and the current location L. The same
process is used to build the habitat for the first time at
system start-up and to adapt it to any changes in nodes’
behaviors.
3.3.1. Initialisation of the elliptic habitat
To initialise the system, the first known location L0 is
used to initialise the habitat with the two focal points at
the same coordinates of L0 and r = 0.
H0 = (L0, L0, 0) (1)
3.3.2. Updating the focal points
Let F1old be the nearest focal point to L and F2old
be the farthest to L focal point. The focal points of the
habitat H are calculated by using EWMA to average the
focal points of the previous version of the habitat Hold and
the current location L. This first step is depicted in Figure
2.
Figure 2: Evolution of the focal points F1old and F2old when the
new location L is used to update the habitat. Function d(L,F )
denotes distance between L and a focal point F . Note that F1 has
been attracted by L using an α factor while F2 has been attracted
using a lesser α
β
factor.
F1 = L ∗ α+ F1old ∗ (1− α) (2)
F2 = L ∗ α
β
+ F2old ∗ (1− α
β
) (3)
By using β > 1, the current location L weights more
when calculating the new position of the nearest focal
point than when calculating the new position of the far-
thest focal point. This means that L attracts more the
nearest focal point, modifying the habitat’s eccentricity
depending on the relative position of L and Hold. The
higher the β used, the more will change the form factor of
the habitat when new distant samples are taken5.
3.3.3. Updating the radius
Let d(L,F ) be the distance between L and a focal point
F . Once F1 and F2 have been updated. The radius r of
the habitat is updated by averaging using EWMA the old
radius rold and the added distances d(L,F1) and d(L,F2)
between each focal point of H and L. This second step is
depicted in Figure 3.
r = (d(L,F1) + d(L,F2)) ∗ α+ rold ∗ (1− α) (4)
Figure 3: Evolution of the radius. Distances and radius are depicted
with dotted lines. The old radius rold is used together with the dis-
tances d(L,F1) and d(L,F2) that separate the updated focal points
F1, F2 and the new location L to update the radius r. The radius
of the habitat will increase if L is out of Hold and will decrease if L
is contained by Hold.
3.3.4. The habitat’s time span
The time span that a habitat considers is a very im-
portant parameter. For example, a reader’s habitat that
considers only the last 2 hours is very likely to be a small
circle around its current location. But if the habitat con-
siders the last 24 hours, it will probably be a bigger ellipse
containing both the reader’s home and the reader’s place of
work. If the considered time span is one week, the reader’s
habitat will also take into account the places where he or
she spends the weekends, and so on.
When the time span of a habitat matches the life-cycle6
of the nodes of the network, then it will become very useful
to predict the areas that the nodes will visit again in the
near future.
5Experiments using β < 50 have shown that the form factor of
the habitats hardly changes and the elliptic habitats usually tend to
be quasi-circular habitats. Therefore, we recommend to use β > 50.
6Usual life-cycles of people are a day or a week. People usually
move very similarly to how they moved in the previous cycle.
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In order to perform meaningful comparisons between
habitats that consider the same time span, PrivHab+ re-
quires the nodes of the network to know it and to calculate
the parameter α using Equation 5. Let ω be the frequency
of update of the habitat in updates/hour, and let T be the
time span that a habitat has to consider in hours.
α =
2
Tω + 1
(5)
Using a parameter α calculated this way, due to the
characteristics of EWMA, the last Tω locations added to
the average tend to weight the 86, 47% of the total. Dur-
ing the rest of the article, we will assume that a habitat
considers a time span of T hours if its parameter α has
been calculated this way.
3.4. Homomorphic Encryption: Paillier
When two nodes come close enough to establish a com-
munication, their habitats have to be compared in order to
choose the best choice for every message. But the habitat
is a sensitive information about the recent movements of a
node, when a node is carried by an animal or a vehicle, or
placed somewhere, this is not a problem. However, When
the node is linked to a person, its habitat is a private in-
formation of this person. In fact, we cannot expect nodes
to harm their own privacy by sharing sensitive information
with their neighbours. For this reason, nodes’ privacy has
to be preserved during the routing process. Our protocol
has to allow a node to compare its habitat with the one of
its neighbour at the same time that avoids the disclosure
of information about any habitat to the other part.
Our protocol uses techniques of public-key cryptog-
raphy, but we require the cryptosystem used to have a
concrete property: to be homomorphic. An homomor-
phic cryptosystem is one in which, given two encrypted
operands E(a) and E(b), one can operate them and com-
pute E(a + b) or E(a · b) without separately decrypting
each one. This way, a node can cypher and send infor-
mation about its habitat to a neighbour, and the neigh-
bour can operate it without violating the privacy of the
first node7. A fully homomorphic cryptosystem, like [?
], capable of performing both the addition and the mul-
tiplication, would be ideal, but this system is not viable
nowadays because of the computational power it requires.
The presented protocol uses the additive homomorphic
Paillier cryptosystem [? ], capable of performing the addi-
tion and the subtraction of two cyphered operands and the
multiplication by a unencrypted scalar. This cryptosystem
is briefly described next.
In a communication between Alice and Bob, Alice starts
by selecting two random primes p and q and computes
n = pq; plaintext messages are elements of Zn; however,
ciphertext messages are elements of Zn2 . Then Alice picks
a random g ∈ Z∗n2 such that gcd((L(gλ mod n2)), n) = 1,
7Sections 4 and 5 will provide more details about this process.
where λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) and L(x) = (x − 1)/n. Al-
ice’s public key8 is PkA : (n, g) and her private key is
pkA : (λ, p, q).
To encrypt a message m, Bob picks a random r ∈ Z∗n
and computes c = E(m) = gm · rn mod n2, the cypher-
text of m. Finally, Bob can easily compute E(a + b) =
E(a) · E(b) mod n2 = ga+b · (r1 · r2)n mod n2), E(a −
b) = E(a)/E(b) mod n2 = ga−b · (r1/r2)n mod n2), and
E(a · s) = E(a)s mod n2 = ga·s · (rs1)n mod n2) without
decrypting the operands.
Finally, to decrypt a ciphertext c, Alice computesD(c) =
L(cλ mod n2) = m.
3.5. Taxicab geometry
The usage of the Paillier’s cryptosystem restricts the
operations we can use to compare habitats. Concretely,
distances cannot be calculated because there is no way to
calculate a square root. For this reason, we move from the
usual Euclidean geometry to Taxicab geometry [? ].
Figure 4: Taxicab geometry distances. All three pictured lines have
the same length for the route between P1 and P2.
Taxicab is a geometry in which the distance between
two points is the sum of the absolute differences of their
Cartesian coordinates, instead of being the usual euclidean
distance. This distance function is usually called Man-
hattan distance9 and is depicted in Figure 4. Manhattan
distances can be calculated without computing any square
root10, an operation that is not supported by any homo-
morphic cryptosystem.
Throughout the entire article, all geometric calcula-
tions will be operated in Taxicab geometry, and all refer-
ences to distances will refer to Manhattan distances. Fig-
ure 5 provides some examples of the aspect of different
ellipses in Taxicab geometry. Note that in Taxicab geom-
etry, the ellipse is a generalisation of the circle (an ellipse
with the two focal points located at the same place, this
8Note that if Bob does not trust Alice when she generates her
Paillier modulus, he can insist she proves its validity, that it is the
product of exactly two nearly equal primes [? ].
9This name alludes to the grid layout of most streets on the island
of Manhattan. The shortest path a car could take between two
intersections in the borough have length equal to the intersections’
distance in taxicab geometry.
10In order to calculate a Manhattan distance, the absolute value
of a subtraction has to be computed. This operation is also not
supported by any homomorphic cryptosystem, but, in Section 4, we
explain how to calculate it benefiting from Taxicab geometry prop-
erties.
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Figure 5: Examples of ellipses in Taxicab geometry. The circle
(down, at the left), the square (the third figure at the down row)
and the rectangle (above the square) are specific types of ellipses.
also applies in Euclidean geometry); the rectangle (an el-
lipse with a radius equal to the distance between the two
focal points); and the square (an ellipse with a radius equal
to the distance between the two focal points, and the two
focal points placed diagonally between them). In this ar-
ticle we provide the tools to operate with the general case,
the ellipse, optimizations and simplifications to operate
with specific types of ellipses can be easily inferred.
Finally, Figure 6 concludes this section with a visual
summary of how we adapt the habitat concept to use it
as the basis of a Secure Geographical Routing Protocol.
First, the real habitat (represented by the heatmap) is
modelled using an ellipse due to efficiency reasons, then,
the ellipse is considered under Taxicab geometry in order
to protect nodes’ privacy.
Figure 6: The real habitat is modelled using a simple shape as the
ellipse due to efficiency reasons. Then, the Euclidean geometry is
substituted by the Taxicab geometry in order to protect nodes’ pri-
vacy.
4. PrivHab+
In this section, we present PrivHab+, the very first
habitat-based geographical routing protocol that protects
the privacy of the participants. Firstly, we introduce the
notation needed during the rest of the section and ex-
plain the routing algorithm from a high-level point of view.
Then, we take some considerations about the privacy of
all participants and how the operands coming from oth-
ers have to be treated. Later, we explain the method to
solve the three geometric problems our routing algorithm
needs to solve. Following, we provide a method to solve
the three geometric problems without hurting the privacy
of any participant. Then, we present the messages that has
to be exchanged during the execution of the protocol and
we explain how PrivHab+ can be implemented using any
forwarding policy, and we provide some examples. Finally,
we reason about the two-party design of PrivHab+.
4.1. Notation
For the sake of clarity, we provide Table 1, which con-
tains the notation used to refer to each one of the different
elements that will appear in this section and a brief de-
scription of its meaning. From now on, we will use this
notation.
Notation Meaning
A
The node that carries the message
and performs the routing.
B
The other node involved in the
transaction, it is a candidate to
carry the message.
P : (Px, Py)
The point where the message has
to be carried to.
H : (F1, F2, r) A habitat.
Hi The habitat of node i.
ri Radius of the habitat of node i.
F1 : (f1x, f1y)
One of the focal points of a habitat
or ellipse.
F2 : (f2x, f2y)
The other focal point of a habitat
or ellipse.
E An ellipse.
d(Z,W )
Taxicab distance function between
two elements. Let Z be a point
and let W be another point, a
habitat or an ellipse.
X : (a, b)
The nearest point to P that be-
longs to a habitat.
nonce
A positive random value used only
once.
SE . . .NW
Regions of the space relative to a
habitat.
EY (·)
Paillier additive homomorphic en-
cryption function using Y ’s public
key.
DY (·)
Paillier additive homomorphic de-
cryption function using Y ’s pri-
vate key.
Table 1: Notation of all elements used in this Section.
4.2. A two-phase routing protocol
We propose a routing protocol that operates in two
different phases: 1) approximation phase, when messages
are routed towards a geographic area using PrivHab+; 2)
delivery phase, when messages are delivered to their desti-
nation using the classical DTN techniques of routing and
delivery (e.g. direct delivery or Spray-and-Wait [? ]). In
this paper, we focus on the first phase.
During approximation, we use the habitats HA and HB
of nodes A and B to decide who is the best choice to carry
a message whose destination is located near P . We assume
that an approximate location of the destination can always
be known or guessed by the sender of the message, e.g. via
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the usage of a distributed secure position service like [? ]
and [? ], or via the usage of an alternate communication
channel. There are three different situations as depicted in
Figure 7, where our routing algorithm has to decide who
is the best option:
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7: The three possible situations in habitat-based routing: (a)
The next waypoint is located outside the two habitats; (b) Only one
of the two habitats encloses the location of the next waypoint; (c)
The two habitats enclose the location of the next waypoint.
(a) If P is located outside both habitats, then the best
choice will be the node whose habitat is nearest to
P (HB in Figure 7) because it will likely bring the
message nearer to its destination.
(b) If P is located inside one habitat and outside the other,
then the best choice will obviously be the node with
the habitat that contains P (HA in Figure 7).
(c) If P is located inside both habitats, then the best
choice will be the node whose habitat is smaller (HB
in Figure 7). We consider that it is more likely that
this node will pass near P sooner.
We will use this algorithm during the rest of the article
to decide the node that is the best choice to deliver every
message to its destination.
4.3. Privacy
On one hand, the location P is used during routing’s
first phase to approach the destination of a message. There-
fore, this is a routing information, carried by the message,
which have to be known by the routers that take custody
of the message because they will need it in the next execu-
tions of PrivHab+. When the destination does not want
the forwarders to associate P to its identity, a pseudonym
mechanism can be used. The presented protocol is fully
compatible11 with pseudonym generator mechanisms as [?
] or [? ] that generate pseudonyms of the destination
or the forwarders using its public key, or [? ] that uses
a secret shared between the nodes and hashing functions.
These mechanisms can also be used by nodes that are very
jealous of their privacy to avoid other nodes keeping track
of the locations where they have encountered.
11When a node B sends a tuple EA(Z), EA(W ) with Z,W ≥ 0, it
is indistinguishable to A if B is a better carrier than A or if B is the
destination of the message. See Subsection 4.5 for more details.
Moreover, although P could not be linked to a node
thanks to the usage of pseudonyms, it must remain hidden
to the nodes that do not need this information to perform
the routing. This measure is crucial to reduce the amount
of information that B can infer about HA (see Section 5
for more details).
On the other hand, the habitat is a private informa-
tion that every node maintains and updates. It has to be
used during the approximation phase to decide who are
the best node to carry messages near their destination,
but it cannot be made public because this will hurt the
privacy of nodes. For this reason, both A and B need the
protocol to be secure and do not reveal information about
their habitats to the other part.
4.4. Geometric problems of PrivHab+’s routing
As we seen in the previous subsections, to perform our
routing algorithm and compare the two habitats HA and
HB , we need to answer three different questions:
1. How far is P from habitat H?
2. Is P contained inside habitat H?
3. Is HA smaller than HB?
However, in order to protect the privacy of the partic-
ipants, PrivHab+ uses homomorphic cryptography. For
this reason, the set of operations we can use to do the cal-
culations becomes heavily restricted when using operands
coming from different nodes. In particular, we can only
use addition, subtraction and multiplication by a non-
cyphered operand.
For the sake of clarity, we will use the next paragraphs
to briefly explain two different ways to solve these three
problems: 1) from a geometric point of view; and 2) using
the homomorphic cryptography’s constrained tools. Note
that, geometrically, a habitat is equivalent to an ellipse.
4.4.1. Distance from a point to an ellipse: geometrically
The distance from a point P to an ellipse E with two
focal points F1 and F2 and a radius r in Taxicab geometry
is solved this way:
First, we calculate distances d(F1, P ), between F1 and
P , and d(F2, P ), between F2 and P , using Equation 6.
d(F, P ) = |Fx − Px|+ |Fy − Py| (6)
Then, we define E′, the closest point of the border of
E to P . We split these two distances in two parts: the
part that is contained within ellipse; and the part that is
outside the ellipse12.
d(F1, P ) = d(F1, E′) + d(E′, P )
12Note that, in Euclidean geometry, the distance between a point
and an ellipse can not be calculated this way because Equation 7
only holds in Taxicab geometry.
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d(F2, P ) = d(F2, E′) + d(E′, P ) (7)
Then, we add these two distances and we subtract the
radius r = d(F1, E′)+d(F2, E′). As a result, we obtain the
double of the distance between the ellipse and P without
knowing the exact location of E′.
d(F1, P ) + d(F2, P )− r = 2 · d(E′, P ) =
d(F1, E′)+d(F2, E′)+2 ·d(E′, P )−d(F1, E′)−d(F2, E′)
(8)
4.4.2. Distance from a point to a habitat: constrained tools
The absolute value of a cyphered operand cannot be
calculated with the constrained tools of homomorphic cryp-
tography. However, we can take advantage of Equation 9
to walk around this issue and calculate the absolute value
of a subtraction if we know beforehand the relation be-
tween the two operands.
|Z −W | =
{
Z −W : Z > W
W − Z : Z < W (9)
In order to use Equation 9 to obtain the absolute value
needed to calculate the distance from a point to the habitat
(see Equation 6), we need to know the relation between the
coordinates of P : (Px, Py) and the coordinates of the two
focus points F1 : (F1x, F1y) and F2 : (F2x, F2y).
Figure 8: The regions of the space (NW , N , NE, W , C, E, SW ,
S and SE) are defined in the basis of the coordinates of the focal
points F1 and F2. In the example shown, P is located in region E,
and when we know this we can calculate the distances d(F1, P ) and
d(F2, P ).
So we first divide the space into 9 regions, depend-
ing on their relation to the two focus of the habitat, as
depicted in Figure 8. To know the region where P is lo-
cated, we calculate the maximum and minimum values of
the coordinates of the two focus using Equation 10. Then
we compare them with the coordinates of P .
Fxmin = Min(F1x, F2x)
Fxmax = Max(F1x, F2x)
Fymin = Min(F1y, F2y)
Fymax = Max(F1y, F2y) (10)
Once we know the region where P is located, we can
use Equations 6 and 9 to calculate the distances between
F1, F2 and P . Table 2 shows how to calculate the added
distance between the two focus points and P depending
on the region where P is located.
d(F1, P )+
d(F2, P )
Px ≤ Fxmin Fxmin < PxPx ≤ Fxmax Px > Fxmax
Py > Fymax
(Fxmax − Px)+ (Fxmax − Px)+ (Px−Fxmax)+
(Fxmin − Px)+ (Px − Fxmin)+ (Px − Fxmin)+
(Py − Fymax)+ (Py − Fymax)+ (Py − Fymax)+
(Py − Fymin) (Py − Fymin) (Py − Fymin)+
y ≤ Fymax (Fxmax − Px)+
0
(Px−Fxmax)+
(Fxmax − Px)+ (Px − Fxmin)+
Fymin < Py
(Fymax − Py)+ (Fymax − Py)+
(Py − Fymin) (Py − Fymin)
Py ≤ Fymin
(Fxmax − Px)+ (Fxmax − Px)+ (Px−Fxmax)+
(Fxmax − Px)+ (Px − Fxmin)+ (Px − Fxmin)+
(Fymax − Py)+ (Fymax − Py)+ (Fymax − Py)+
(Fymin − Py) (Fymin − Py) (Fymin − Py)
Table 2: Distance between P : (Px, Py) and the two focus point
F1 : (F1x, F1y) and F2 : (F2x, F2y), depending on where P is
located.
After d(F1, P )+d(F2, P ) is obtained from Table 2, the
last thing to do is to subtract the radius r, using Equation
8 to obtain 2 · d(H,P ), the double of the distance between
P and the habitat H.
Finally, Equation 11 shows how to use the double of
the distance to compare two habitats and decide which
one is closer to a certain point P .
2 ·d(HA, P )−2 ·d(HB , P ) < 0 ⇐⇒ d(HA, P ) < d(HB , P )
(11)
Note that a distance between P and H calculated this
way will be negative if P is contained inside H. On the
next paragraphs we will explain how benefit from this fact
to know if P is inside or outside the habitat. Note also
that the usage of other models of habitat as the square,
the circle or the rectangle, that are specific types of el-
lipses, would simplify the calculations because some re-
gions would disappear and would not need to be consid-
ered.
4.4.3. A point contained inside an ellipse: geometrically
Given an ellipse E characterized by two focal points
F1 : (F1x, F1y) and F2 : (F2x, F2y) and a radius r, a
point P : (Px, Py) is contained inside E if and only if
Equation 12 holds.
|Px−F1x|+ |Py−F1y|+ |Px−F2x|+ |Py−F2y| ≤ r (12)
4.4.4. A point contained inside a habitat: constrained tools
As we have seen, to calculate the distance from a point
P to a habitat H, what we really calculate is the double
of the distance from a point P located outside the habi-
tat H to the nearest point of H. If P is located inside the
habitat, due to the usage of Equation 9, the absolute value
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of the distance will be a negative value13. Far from being
a drawback, we benefit from this property to use the cal-
culated distance to the habitat to know if P is contained
inside it, as shown in Equation 13.
d(H,P ) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ P ∈ H (13)
4.4.5. Comparative of size between ellipses: geometrically
Given two ellipses, E1 and E2, and their respective
radius r1 and r2, the smaller ellipse is the one that have
the lesser radius. Therefore, E1 is the smaller ellipse if
Equation 14 holds, otherwise, E2 is the smaller one.
r1 < r2 (14)
4.4.6. Comparative of size between habitats: constrained
tools
To compare the size of habitats HA and HB , we sub-
tract their radius rA and rB one from another. Then, we
check the sign of the result to decide which habitat is the
smallest.
(rA − rB) ∗ nonce ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ HA > HB
(rA − rB) ∗ nonce < 0 ⇐⇒ HA < HB (15)
Note on Equation 15 that we use a positive nonce. This
value is unknown for the other part of the transaction. It
is used to hide the real relation between the radius of the
habitats and provide a randomized response. Later, the
other part will binarize the result by taking into account
only its sign.
4.5. Messages exchanged
Let A be the node that carries a set of messages mi,
with a habitat HA : (F1A, F2A, rA). Let Pi : (Pxi, Pyi) be
the point where each message mi wants to be carried to,
and B be a neighbour with a habitat HB : (F1B , F2B , rB).
We denote a message sent by A to B with A → B :
message. By the previous definitions, A want to know
if B is a better choice to carry each message mi towards
Pi.
PrivHab+ consists in five steps, the first of them is
totally asynchronous, and requires nodes to exchange three
messages. Depending on the result of the execution of the
algorithm, an additional last one (the forwarded message)
is sent.
0. Node A calculates dAi = d(HA, Pi), the distance be-
tween its habitat and every Pi; A uses dAi = 0 if
P ∈ HA and dAi ≥ 1 otherwise. As A knows both
13Note that our protocol checks several times if an operand ρ is
positive or negative. In the Paillier cryptosystem, ρ will be an ele-
ment of Zn. To check this condition, if we ensure that n is sufficiently
large and that all values ρ we will use are ρ ≤ n/2, then we can con-
sider that ρ > n/2 ⇐⇒ ρ < 0.
HA and Pi, and the operations do not need to be
performed using homomorphic encryption.
Besides, node B calculates the characteristics of its
habitat: Fxmax, Fxmin, Fymax and Fymin using
Equation 10. This calculations can be done asyn-
chronously (e. g. when the habitat is updated).
1. From that moment on, each time B establishes a con-
tact with and any other node, B starts by announc-
ing the characteristics of its habitat to its neigh-
bours14.
B → A: EB(Fxmax), EB(Fxmin),
EB(Fymax), EB(Fymin)
2. Node A compares each received value with the cor-
responding coordinates of each point Pi. The com-
parisons are done by subtracting the corresponding
coordinate of Pi from the characteristics of the habi-
tat and then multiplying the result, to randomize
it, with a random one-use value denoted nonce. A
compares Fxmax with Pxi using Equation 16, and
calculates the other comparisons the same way. The
first two received values are compared with Pxi and
the last two with Pyi.(
EB(Fxmax)
EB(Pxi)
)nonce
= EB((Fxmax − Pxi) · nonce)
(16)
Then A sends the comparisons15 to B together with
the coordinates of each Pi, the distance dAi and the
radius rA of HA.
A→ B:
EA(rA), {EB((Fxmax − Pxi) · nonce),
EA(Pxi), EB((Fxmin − Pxi) · nonce),
EA(Pyi), EB((Fymax − Pyi) · nonce),
EA(2dAi), EB((Fymin − Pyi) · nonce)}i
3. For each Pi, B decrypts all the received comparisons.
Node B knows that each decrypted value greater
than zero means that the characteristic of the habitat
is greater than the corresponding coordinate of Pi.
This way B decides the region where Pi is placed.
Then, B calculates distance 2dBi. Afterwards, B
computes the comparison between 2dAi and 2dBi,
using Equation 17, and the comparison of radius16
rA and rB using Equation 18.
(
EB(2dAi)
EB(2dBi)
)nonce
= EB((2dAi − 2dBi) · nonce)
(17)
14This announcement can be made during the neighbour discovery
process, by adding this information to the beacons.
15We have used “{” and “}i” to enclose the part of the information
that is repeated one time for each message mi.
16The added element dAi · rB blurs the comparison. This way A
can only infer information about HB ’s radius when Pi is contained
both by HA and HB . See Section 5 for more details.
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(
EA(rA) · EA(2dAi)rB
EA(rB)
)nonce
= EA((rA + 2dAi · rB − rB) · nonce) (18)
The last step for B is to send the results, but before
that, B orders each pair of comparisons in a random
way unknown to A.
B → A:
{EA((2dAi − 2dBi) · nonce),
EA((rA + 2dAi · rB − rB) · nonce)
or
EA((rA + 2dAi · rB − rB) · nonce),
EA((2dAi − 2dBi) · nonce)}i
4. Finally, node A decrypts each pair of comparisons.
For every message mi for whom the two decrypted
values are equal or greater than 0, A learns that
B is a better choice. Knowing that, A applies its
forwarding policy (more details are provided below)
to decide if any message has to be sent to B.
A→ B: {mi}i
Figure 9 provides a schema of the messages exchanged
during each phase of the protocol.
4.6. Forwarding policy
After the execution of PrivHab+, node A carrying mes-
sage mi knows if the execution was successful and if B is
a better choice to carry the message towards its destina-
tion. Then, A decides if the message has to be forwarded
to B, and if a copy of mi has to be kept in A. The num-
ber of copies of every message flowing through the net-
work will be directly determined by the forwarding policy
used. Therefore, this decision, determined by the forward-
ing policy of A, can have an impact on the performance of
PrivHab+.
PrivHab+ is compatible with any forwarding policy.
As this paper is essentially focused on the decision mak-
ing, meaning the comparison of two nodes to decide who
is the best choice, the study of the forwarding policy is out
of the scope of this paper. However, we provide next a set
of examples of different forwarding policies that could be
applied. Note that we do not pretend this set to be com-
plete. Further research is planned by the authors to study
and analyse all possible options to find the best policy for
each scenario.
• Direct single-copy policy: nodes always forward
the message to the node that is a better choice, no
copies of the messages are created.
• Direct multi-copy policy: nodes always forward
the message to the node that is a better choice, but
each node that has forwarded a message keeps one
copy of it.
A B
Figure 9: Schema of the messages exchanged during the execution
of PrivHab+. At Step 0) the two nodes asynchronously perform
calculations that will be used during the protocol. At Step 1) node B
uses the neighbour discovery process to send to A the characteristics
of the habitat HB . At Step 2) node A sends to B the distance
2d(HA, Pi) and the information B needs to calculate 2d(HB , Pi). At
Step 3) node B compares both distances, and the radius of the two
habitats, randomizes the results and sends them to A. Finally, at
Step 4) A decrypts the comparisons to know if B is a better choice
than A. Finally, A sends, or not, the message mi to B according to
its forwarding policy.
• Limited multi-copy policy: nodes forward the
message to the node that is a better choice and keep
a copy a limited amount of times. When a node
reaches the threshold for a message, no more copies
of this message are created, and it is not forwarded
more by this node. Many different strategies can be
used to define the threshold of every node and every
message.
• Probabilistic policy: messages are forwarded to
the node that is a better choice a X% of times. They
are also forwarded to nodes that are a worse choice a
or do not have a habitat to compare a Y% of times.
Besides, nodes keep a copy of the forwarded message
the Z% of times, where X, Y and Z are parameters
of the network.
• Multi-criteria policy: nodes execute other routing
algorithms and combine their output with PrivHab+’s
one to decide if the message has to be forwarded and
if a copy has to be kept at the node.
For the sake of simplicity, during the rest of this paper
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we will assume that PrivHab+ uses, by default, the direct
single-copy forwarding policy.
4.7. A two-party protocol
At [? ], the authors have studied the enormous com-
plexity of realizing a multi-party secure comparison be-
tween an indefinite number of nodes. Besides, encounters
between two nodes are the most common [? ], encoun-
ters between three, four or more nodes are so rare that
they cannot have a huge impact on the performance of
the network. For the sake of simplicity and to maintain
the computational overhead as low as possible, we have
designed PrivHab+ to operate between two nodes.
t=
t=t=
t=
t=
Figure 10: Node N0 carrying a message meets N1, N2 and N3.
Numbers denote the order of the operations. N0 compares itself
with N1 using PrivHab+ and finds that N1 is a worse choice, so it
does not forward the message. Then N0 compares itself with N2,
who results to be a better choice, so the message is forwarded to N2.
Finally, N2 compares itself with N3 using PrivHab+ and forwards
the message to N3 because it is a better choice.
PrivHab+ solves the encounters where three or more
nodes meet, iterating its execution. PrivHab+ low over-
head allow nodes to execute it more than once, and the
“winner” of each comparison can be compared again with
another neighbour. This process can be repeated until all
nodes have been compared and the best has been found,
or until the connectivity window ends. Figure 10 illus-
trates this process. This way, if the communication ends
suddenly before all comparisons are finished, PrivHab+
will find at least a partial “winner”. In the figure, if the
communication ends before forwarding the message to the
best node (N3), this partial “winner” would be N2, who
is better than N0 and N1.
5. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse the knowledge obtained by
each participant of PrivHab+ under the scope of secure
multi-party computations. We first consider the passive
adversary mode, where one participant executes the pro-
tocol and then makes inferences to obtain knowledge about
the other participant’s inputs. Then, we consider the ac-
tive adversary mode, where one participant tampers its
messages to try to obtain an advantage. Then, we reason
about the security obtained in the two models.
5.1. Passive adversay mode
A secure multi-party computation [? ] consists in com-
puting a function on any input, on a network where dif-
ferent participants hold each input, and ensuring that no
more information is revealed to a participant than what
can be inferred from that participant’s input and the com-
puted output.
Following, we treat routing as a secure multi-party
computation problem where the result of a routing algo-
rithm has to be computed using private data held by the
candidate nodes to carry the message. In order to con-
sider PrivHab+ as a secure protocol, we need to prove
that it reveals only the result of the function and the in-
ferences that can be deduced from this output with one or
more input values [? ]. We consider a passive adversary
mode where the participants exchange truthful messages
and then analyse them trying to obtain information about
the other part’s habitat.
5.1.1. Knowledge obtained by A
Table 3 summarizes all knowledge that can be learned
by A, the node that carries the message, about HB , the
habitat of the candidate node B. In all cases, the obtained
knowledge is inferred using the output of the protocol and
the inputs provided byA. None information can be learned
from the messages exchanged with B, because they are
encrypted with B’s key, and the ones that A can decrypt
are randomized through the usage of random nonce values.
A knows A infers
Input Output dA ↔ dB P ↔ HB rA ↔ rB
P ∈ HA
B dA = dB = 0 P ∈ HB rA ≥ rB
A dA ≤ dB P /∈ HB or rA < rB
P /∈ HA
B dA ≥ dB Nothing Nothing
A dA < dB P /∈ HB Nothing
Table 3: Knowledge obtained by A at the end of the protocol. If
B is found to be a better choice, then A infers that B is a better
candidate and that HB is closer to location P than HA. Node A also
infers that HB is smaller than HA in the case that P is contained
inside HA. If B is found to be a worse choice, then A infers that HB
is farther to P than HA, but cannot know if HB is bigger or smaller
than HA.
5.1.2. Knowledge obtained by B
The knowledge obtained by B depends on the forward-
ing policy of A. The only thing B knows is not the out-
put of PrivHab+, but the fact that the message has fi-
nally been forwarded or not. If the forwarding policy used
makes possible to not send the message when B is a better
choice, or to send the message even if B is a worse choice,
then B cannot infer PrivHab+’s output. Therefore, in this
situation B cannot learn anything about HA. Assuming
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that B knows A’s forwarding policy, we will analyse the
worst-case scenario: a direct (single-copy or multi-copy)
forwarding policy that allows B to know the output of
PrivHab+ from the forwarding of the message.
B knows B learns B infers
Output About P About dB dA ↔ dB
Message
P : (Px, Py) dB dA ≥ dBreceived
Message do Region where
Nothing dA ≤ dBnot received P is located
Table 4: Knowledge obtained by B at the end of the protocol. If
the message is sent B infers that it is a better candidate than A and
receives the coordinates of P with the message. If the message is not
sent, B learns the region where P is located, but not dB . This only
applies in the worst-case scenario: when the forwarding policy of A
makes the output of PrivHab+ easy to establish for B.
Table 4 summarizes all knowledge that can be learned
by B, the candidate node to take custody of the message.
Only one information, P ’s region, can be learned from
the message received from A. Since HA characteristics
are encrypted with A’s key, and the comparisons that B
can decrypt are randomized through the usage of random
nonce values. Only the region where P is located is re-
vealed. This knowledge about P ’s region is necessary for
B to calculate dB . Node B can also infer the relation be-
tween dA and dB , even without knowing
17 dB , from the
forwarding of the message. Note that maintaining P hid-
den to B (only P ’s region is revealed) if the message is not
forwarded is crucial to avoid that B can calculate dB and
use it to infer more information about HA.
5.1.3. Conclusions
Anything learned by A about HB , or by B about HA,
from the protocol is also learnable from the output alone.
The computation made is a routing protocol, so, if m is
forwarded to B, coordinates of P are revealed to B because
they will be needed in the next executions. Otherwise, the
only thing B learns about P is the region18 where it is
located in relation with HB , because this knowledge is
necessary for B to compute dB .
Therefore, PrivHab+ is secure to A and B because
it reveals only the result of the algorithm and inferences
derived from this result. Besides, PrivHab+ provides best-
effort privacy to P because it hides its location and reveals
only the region where P is located. As we have explained
in the previous section, this can be easily enhanced by
breaking the relation between the destination and P using
a pseudonym generator mechanism.
17Node B does not even know dB until receiving P with the mes-
sage and computing the distance again. The reason is that dB is
calculated via homomorphic cryptography and only A can decrypt
it.
18The region where P is located is far less accurate that the coor-
dinates of P or the distance between P and HB . Moreover, B does
not even know who is the destination, and therefore, B cannot relate
this P ’s region with any node.
5.2. Active adversary mode
In the active adversary mode, we consider an attacker
that may use untruthful information about their own habi-
tat, the messages they carry, or the location P where a
message is intended, in order to disclose private informa-
tion about the other part’s habitat.
5.2.1. Knowledge obtained by A
A node carrying a message can lie about P , dA and rA
in order to uncover information about HB . There are two
strategies that an active attacker A can follow: 1) Produce
chosen-destination arbitrary messages using a set of false
P ′ and d′A to try to discover the area covered by HB ; and
2) tamper r′A to learn about rB .
1. Discover the area covered by HB: every time PrivHab+
is executed, A learns that HB is located completely
outside a circle with centre at P and radius dA if
node A is chosen as the best choice. The same way,
A learns that at least one part of HB is located in-
side a circle with centre at P and radius dA if the
best choice is B. Therefore, node A can exploit this
by producing arbitrary messages destined to a set of
locations P ′ and using set of false distances d′A, and
then repeatedly execute PrivHab+ to try to learn
the area covered by HB . The knowledge that A can
obtain from this is summarized by Table 5.
A knows A learns Useful
Output About dB iff
A dB ≥ d′A d′A > dA
B dB ≤ d′A d′A < dA
Table 5: Knowledge obtained by A at the end of the protocol when
A uses d′A and P
′ instead of dA and P . If A is chosen, A learns
where HB is not located. If B is chosen, A learns that a part of HB
is inside an area. The third column establishes the situations where
it is useful for A to lie about dA.
2. Discover rB: the result of an execution of PrivHab+
consists of a tuple containing two results randomly
ordered. Each result can be greater or equal than
zero (≥ 0), or negative (< 0). One of them, the ra-
dius comparison, only makes sense if and only if dA =
0. In order to know the result of the radius com-
parison, A needs to repeteadly execute PrivHab+
using the same values d′A = 0 and r
′
A, and a dif-
ferent P , until obtaining a different result in one of
the two comparisons. When this happens, node A
learns which result corresponds to each comparison,
and learns if rB is higher or lesser than r
′
A. Note
that the only way to obtain a different result in one
comparison using this method is by using two false
P ′1 and P
′
2 that are located one inside HB and the
other outside it. Table 6 summarizes this process.
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A knows A learns Useful
Result 1 Result 2 Pi ∈ HB r′A ↔ rB iff
(< 0, < 0) (< 0,≥ 0) P2 r′A < rB r′A > rA
(< 0,≥ 0) (≥ 0,≥ 0) P2 r′A ≥ rB r′A < rA
(< 0,≥ 0) (< 0, < 0) P1 r′A < rB r′A > rA
(≥ 0,≥ 0) (< 0,≥ 0) P1 r′A ≥ rB r′A < rA
Table 6: Knowledge obtained by A. Depending on how the result of
the comparison of distances change when using a different P ′, node
A learns the relation between r′A and rB . If A has selected P1
′ and
P2′ randomnly, then he also learns which of them is located inside
HB and which is located outside it. The third column establishes
the situations where it is useful for A to lie about rA.
5.2.2. Knowledge obtained by B
Node B does not initiate the execution of PrivHab+,
nor controls the amount of messagesmi that will be routed.
Then, its only chance to lie is manipulating the results of
the comparisons sent in Step 3. The candidate node B can
lie about its habitat, using H ′B instead of HB , or about
the distance from its habitat to P , using d′B instead of
dB . Given that using a tampered habitat H
′
B will lead to
the calculation of an untruthful distance d′B , both cases
can be treated likewise. Table 7 summarizes all knowledge
learned by B in these two cases.
B knows B learns Useful
Output About dA iff
Message
dA ≥ d′B d′B > dBreceived
Message do
dA ≤ d′B
d′B < dB
not received B knows P
Table 7: Knowledge obtained by B at the end of the protocol when
B uses d′B instead of dB . If the message is sent B infers that it is a
better candidate than A. The third column establishes the situations
where it is useful forB to lie about dB . This only applies in the worst-
case scenario: when the forwarding policy of A makes the output of
PrivHab+ easy to establish for B.
Node B will obtain more information about HA lying
than being truthful only if B finally receives the message
and d′B > dB , or if B does not receive the message and
d′B < dB . In both cases, P , and, therefore dB , are un-
known to B prior of the exchange. Therefore, B wants d′B
to be high to obtain more information if B will win the
comparison, but a higher d′b makes B less likely to win it.
Equivalently, B wants d′B to be small if B will lose the
comparison, but a lesser d′b makes B more likely to be se-
lected as the best candidate. Besides, B will not obtain P
if does not receive the message, and knowing the distance
between HA and P is not useful if P is unknown. For these
reasons, there is no a straightforward strategy to select H ′B
or dB and guarantee that B will take an advantage from
this.
5.2.3. Conclusions
An active attacker can try to learn things about the
other part’s habitat by using untruthful information dur-
ing the execution of PrivHab+. A can try to learn the
area covered by HB and its radius rB , while B can try
to learn the distance from HA to P . In both cases, the
information obtained by the attacker is the same informa-
tion (the result of one or more comparisons) that he can
infer from a truthful execution of the protocol. The only
thing an attacker can change is the value to compare with
the other part’s radius or distance. However, the attacker
can only benefit from these changes if the change made
and the result of PrivHab+ are aligned. And in all cases
happens that changing the value to improve its usefulness
decreases the probability of obtaining the desired result.
As A is the node that starts the transaction and the
only one that knows the number of messages he carries,
he can determine how many times to execute PrivHab+.
If A executes PrivHab+ enough times, using untruthful
information and the attacks described in subsection 5.2.1,
he can completely uncover the area covered by HB and its
radius. Given that nodes always operate with encrypted
data, there is no way for one part to tell apart a truthful
execution of PrivHab+ from an untruthful one. However,
B can decrease the effectiveness of these attacks by limit-
ing the amount of interactions per unit of time with every
other node.
When A is performing a serie of untruthful executions
to discover B’s habitat, A wants to know the result of
the previous execution to improve the amount of obtained
information in the next one. For example, A can start
by selecting an evenly spread set of positions to try to
discover the area covered by HB . However, when A has
found that there is a part of HB inside the circle defined
by one of these positions, it is much more useful to A to
investigate this circle and its surroundings than continue
with the remaining positions. Therefore, B can reduce the
effectiveness of the attacker by taking the countermeasure
of forcing A to send him at once the information needed
to perform all the executions before sending any response.
Finally, when combining the two proposed measures,
limiting the amount of executions per unit of time, and
requiring all the information at once before sending any
results to A, the effectivity of an active attack becomes
greatly reduced, and the attacker ends learning almost the
same things that he would learn by being truthful. Be-
sides, the information protected by PrivHab+, the habi-
tat, changes periodically. For this reason, slowing enough
an attack can be considered equivalently as avoiding it, be-
cause when time passes the habitats change and the first
things learned by the attacker become obsolete.
6. Experimental Results
In this section we present some details about the proof-
of-concept we have implemented. Then, we provide mea-
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surements of the computational and communication over-
head introduced by the presented protocol.
6.1. Implementation details
We have deployed an implementation of the presented
protocol on two different sets of devices: three Raspberry
Pi boards19, and two i5 laptops20. The Raspberry Pi
boards are very cheap low-end devices, ideals to deploy a
cheap prototype network that will allow us to run field ex-
periments in a near future. The laptops have been chosen
as representatives of short-term high-end mobile devices,
indeed the i5 processor slightly outperforms the iPhone
6’ A8, the most powerful mobile phone processor prior to
the writing of this article. The objective of this proof-of-
concept implementation is to demonstrate the viability of
the proposal, and to obtain a measure of the overhead that
PrivHab+ adds to every transaction.
6.2. Results obtained
We have established a DTN network using the chosen
devices and we have used this implementation to send 500
messages of sizes between 10MB and 20MB. We have re-
peated the tests five times, using Paillier’s length keys of
512, 1024 and 2048 bits. We have measured the average
time needed to make the calculations and to exchange all
messages of Figure 9. The obtained results are shown in
Table 9, and have been incorporated to the simulations.
As can be seen in Table 9, PrivHab+ execution time
depends heavily on the key length used. When using keys
of 512 bits, PrivHab+ can be executed by a low-end de-
vice in less than a second, meaning an overhead of less
than a 5% when sending messages larger than 10MB. The
execution time increases to almost 5.5 seconds when using
keys of 1024 bits. Given the average length of connectiv-
ity windows in remote village scenarios presented in [? ],
this overhead is acceptable. The usage of keys of 2048 bits
or more in low-end devices is discouraged because of the
high overhead times they produce. In a high-end proces-
sor, PrivHab+ can be executed in less than a second even
when using extra-large keys of 2048 bits. Due to this, the
key length should be chosen keeping in mind the devices
used and the time that can be spent by executing the pro-
tocol.
PrivHab+ can be executed once to simultaneously route
all messages. This is called a multi-destination execution.
This execution is faster but its result is all-or-nothing,
meaning that no message can be routed if the connectiv-
ity window suddenly ends before finishing the execution
19Raspberry Pi Broadcom BCM2835 SoC full HD, 700MHz Low
Power ARM1176JZ-F, 512MB SDRAM, 512MB SD with Raspbian,
equipped with a Wi-Pi Wireless Adapter (802.11n up to 150Mbps),
a GPS receiver NL-302U (baud rate: 4800 bauds) and a dual output
5000mAh battery.
20Intel Core-i5 (third generation): dual core 3,3 GHz, 4GB RAM,
WiFi 802.11 b/g/n Dual Antenna, with Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, equipped
with a GPS receiver NL-302U (baud rate: 4800 bauds).
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
T
im
e
(s
ec
on
d
s)
Amount of messages
PrivHab+ execution time
Type of execution
Iterated
Multi-destination
Figure 11: Execution time between the two different strategies to
execute PrivHab+ with multiple messages to send, in a Raspberry
Pi using keys of 512 bits. Executing the whole protocol one time for
each destination lasts around 20% more than performing one multi-
destination execution.
of PrivHab+. In contrast, PrivHab+ can be executed to
route one message at a time. This is called the iterated exe-
cution. This execution is slower, lasts 20% more time than
the multi-destination execution, but when the communi-
cation suddenly ends, all previously processed messages
have been routed. Figure 11 depicts the time needed by
PrivHab+ to execute the protocol when routing messages
using both types of execution. The authors suggest to use
a mixed strategy: using one multi-destination execution
to route the first messages and then iterate each message
one by one.
Finally, Table 8 shows the percentage of time consumed
by each operation. The time needed to compute and send
the first message, during steps 0 and 1, is not counted as
a part of PrivHab+’s overhead because this message can
be computed and sent asynchronously during the neigh-
bour discovery phase, as explained in Section 4. As can
be seen, the communicational overhead is quasi negligi-
ble, and most of the time is spent to compute the third
message, at step 3. In fact, the computation of the third
message is the most time-consuming operation because it
includes decrypting the second message, calculating the
distance between the habitat and the destination, and cal-
culating the results operating with cyphered operands.
7. Simulations
In this section we explain the two scenarios we have
chosen to evaluate PrivHab+’s performance, and how we
have modelled and simulated it. Afterwards, we provide
the obtained results of both scenarios, comparing PrivHab+
performance and characteristics with other popular DTN
routing algorithms. Finally, we provide a qualitative com-
parison with all other evaluated routing protocols.
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Device
Key length Steps 0 and 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Sending
(bits) computation computation computation computation messages
Raspberry Pi
512 13.54% 27.15% 61.01% 11.33% 0.51%
1024 13.79% 26.13% 62.07% 11.48% 0.32%
2048 16.87% 30.56% 56.12% 13.08% 0.24%
i5 Laptop
512 11.06% 35.03% 54.58% 9.18% 1.21%
1024 12.58% 31.11% 58.89% 9.69% 0.31%
2048 13.29% 26.71% 61.18% 12.05% 0.06%
Table 8: Percentage of the execution time spent in every operation. The communicational overhead is negligible and almost all the overhead
introduced is computational. Note that rows add more than 100% because the computation of steps 0 and 1 is done asynchronously and it
is not taken into account to calculate the execution time of PrivHab+.
Device
Key
Time
Overhead Overhead
length
(ms)
10MB 20MB
(bits) (%) (%)
Raspberry
512 783.95 4.74 2.42
Pi
1024 5, 487.94 33.21 16.94
2048 34, 244.12 207.26 105.72
i5
512 20.58 0.12 0.06
Laptop
1024 118.91 0.71 0.36
2048 755.54 4.57 2.33
Table 9: Execution time of PrivHab+ to route one message in both
devices, the Raspberry Pi and the i5 Laptop, using different key
lengths. The overhead is calculated as the extra amount of time
needed to send a message of 10MB or 20MB.
7.1. First scenario: podcasts distribution in Cajamarca
To carry out the first set of simulations, we have cho-
sen a podcasts distribution scenario located in the Caja-
marca region, in Peru´, where the NGO Practical Action21
records podcast radio programmes targeted to farmers in
Compact Discs and physically distributes them to the lo-
cal radio stations. The scenario consists of an NGO office
located in the village of Chota that distributes radio pod-
cast programs to two NGO’s local radio stations located in
the villages of Huambos and Cutervo. We substituted the
physical distribution method by a digital and automated
one using DTN networking. The podcasts are distributed
through an opportunistic network. This application has
to deal with challenges like a sparse population, with the
receivers of the information far away from each other, a
rugged terrain and a lack of data communication networks.
This scenario has been chosen because its characteris-
tics make it ideal to evaluate the performance of a geo-
graphic routing protocol. Firstly, the area, shown in Fig-
ure 12, is full of mountains that restrict the movement
of the nodes, so short-term movement information as the
speed vector of a node is not useful to route messages.
Secondly, due to the movement patterns of nodes there
are pairs of nodes whose probability of encounter is almost
zero. These nodes are forced to use intermediate nodes to
carry their messages towards its destination. Besides, it is
21More information about this programme at
http://practicalaction.org/podcasting-3
Chota
Cutervo
Huambos
Obstacle
Obstacle
Obstacle
Figure 12: Map of a scenario of application located in a rural area
of Cajamarca (Peru´). White lines are natural obstacles approxi-
mate limits. Dotted white lines represent the pathways where mes-
sages sent from the village of Chota to Cutervo or to Huambos have
to be routed through. The size of the area under consideration is
30x30Km.
based on a real application of DTN networking placed in
an environment that lacks network infrastructure, where
a solution based in the usage of small and cheap devices
would be viable.
7.2. Second scenario: podcasts distribution in Gwanda
To carry out the second set of simulations, we have
chosen another podcasts distribution scenario located in
Gwanda, in Zimbabwe. Due to the success of their ini-
tiative in other rural areas, the NGO Practical Action22
use a manpower of 60 cooperators to bring the podcasts
to the villagers. The poor radio signal of the area makes
unusable the approach of recording CDs and distributing
it to the local radio stations. Therefore, the cooperators,
equipped with portable MP3 players and speakers, have
to physically travel to the NGO office to obtain new pod-
casts. The scenario consists of an NGO office located in
the village of Gwanda that distributes radio podcast pro-
grams to five cooperators that roam around Gwanda, the
village of Sablevale and the two main farm’s zones near
Gwanda. We implemented a digital and automated distri-
bution method that distributes the podcasts through an
22More information about this programme at
http://practicalaction.org/podcasting-gwanda
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opportunistic network. This application has to deal with
challenges like a sparse population, mobile receivers of the
information, and a lack of data communication networks.
Farm's zone 1
Gwanda
Sablevale Obstacle
Obstacle
Obstacle
Farm's zone 2
Figure 13: Map of a scenario of application located in Gwanda (Zim-
babwe). White lines are natural obstacles approximate limits. Dot-
ted white lines represent the pathways where messages sent from the
InfoCenter of Gwanda to Sablevale and the two farm’s zones have to
be routed through.
This scenario has been chosen to evaluate the perfor-
mance of PrivHab+ because it has some characteristics
different than the previous one. The area is smaller than
the Cajamarca’s one (15x7Km) and, as shown in Figure
13, the main physical obstacle that restricts the movement
of the nodes is the Mtshabezi River. Besides, the density
of nodes is higher, and there are five different mobile desti-
nations, although the NGO knows the approximated zone
where they are assigned. As there are more destinations
than in the Cajamarca scenario, and nodes are very un-
likely to be useful to deliver messages to more than one
destination. Therefore, there are more nodes whose useful-
ness to deliver messages to certain destinations is almost
zero, and a good decision making is critical to obtain a
good performance.
7.3. Characteristics of the application
The application we consider in these two scenarios is
a podcast distribution application based on the needs of
the NGO Practical Action. This NGO already has a man-
power of cooperators devoted to distributing the podcasts
physically in the two explained scenarios. Therefore, we
assume that it could be easy to assign one cheap device to
every cooperator. This way, Practical Action could trans-
form its manpower of cooperators into a Delay Tolerant
Network of mobile nodes.
One can think that a cooperator that has been assigned
by the NGO to a certain area, and that has received a de-
vice from the NGO in order to distribute the podcasts in
that area, may not be very concerned about the privacy of
its habitat or the amount of buffer occupied by the pod-
casts. However, if the NGO wants to extend the network
cheaply by adding other types of nodes, e.g. volunteers
that want to help the NGO, there are two characteristics
of PrivHab+ that can make it more useful than other DTN
routing solutions: 1) PrivHab+ protects the privacy of its
users; and 2) PrivHab+ can achieve a good performance
occupying a small buffer.
A volunteer could just install an app on his PDA to
become part of the network. This way, he could help the
podcast distribution by simply carrying his mobile device
in the pocket when he performs his daily routine. Given
that hurting people’s privacy do not seem a good way to
incentivize them to install an app, it is important that
PrivHab+ guarantees their privacy. The same way, we
can not expect users to renounce to a big part of their
storage capacity to carry podcasts because they probably
want to continue using their devices normally. As a high
usage of resources will give the users reasons for leaving the
network, it is desirable to reduce as much as possible the
impact on the users’ devices. Therefore, it is useful that
PrivHab+ is capable of achieving a good performance even
using small storage buffers.
7.4. Simulation details
In our interpretation of these scenarios, nodes imple-
ment a mobility pattern that takes into account home and
work locations. Nodes have a 200MB buffer and a wireless
interface featuring a communication range of 30 meters
and speed up to 500Kbps. Messages of 10-20MB23 are
injected periodically in the network by the NGO office,
who knows the location, exact on the first scenario, ap-
proximated on the second one, of the waypoints and the
destinations. The type and the amount of nodes simulated
in each scenario are shown on Table 10.
Number and Scenario
type of nodes Cajamarca Gwanda
Total 95 66
Source 1 static 1 static
Destination 2 static 5 mobile
Other 92 mobile 60 mobile
Table 10: Number and type of the nodes involved in the simulations
of each scenario.
During the approximation phase nodes calculate their
habitat as explained in Section 3, and the protocol de-
tailed in Section 4 is used to make the routing decisions.
For the sake of simplicity, nodes implementing PrivHab+
use a direct single-copy forwarding policy. During the de-
livery phase, nodes use direct delivery to give the messages
to their destination. We have modelled the computational
and communication overhead introduced by PrivHab+ con-
sidering that nodes need 5.5 additional seconds to perform
each transaction. This overhead time is based on real ex-
perimentation, it is the average time consumed by a Rasp-
berry Pi board using a 1024 bits key.
23This is the size of an audio file with ID3 version 2.4.0, extended
header, contains: MPEG ADTS, layer III, v1, 128 kbps, 44.1 kHz,
stereo, with a duration between 10 and 20 minutes.
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Figure 14: Obtained results in terms of latency and delivery ratio in the Cajamarca scenario. PrivHab+ and MaxProp perform far better
than the rest, obtaining a low latency and a high delivery ratio.
In both scenarios, we have compared the performance
obtained by PrivHab+ (using T = 48 hours on the first
scenario, T = 24 on the second one, and β = 60 on both)
with a bench-mark of well-known routing protocols used
in [? ]: Prophet [? ], Binary Spray & Wait (L=40) [? ],
Epidemic and Random [? ]. We have added two routing
protocols to this set: MaxProp [? ] and First Contact. All
simulations have been performed using The Opportunistic
Network Simulator (The ONE) [? ], and have been re-
peated twenty times using different random seeds, then,
the average results of the twenty repetitions have been
calculated.
7.5. Simulation results: Cajamarca
Results obtained on the first scenario are shown in Fig-
ure 14, where the performance of all the compared pro-
tocols in terms of delivery ratio and latency is depicted.
Single-copy protocols, as First Contact and Random ob-
tain a medium-to-high delivery ratio because they do not
face most of the problems related to the size of the buffers
and nodes’ congestion. In contrast, their latency is high.
Random’s decision making is equally likely to make a bad
or a good choice at every relay, but the latter ones are far
more rare and valuable. First Contact performs slightly
better because it avoids loops and forces messages to move
away from their origin after they have visited all the near
neighbours. Flooding-based protocols, as Epidemic and
Prophet, obtain low latencies but also low delivery ratios.
These protocols fill the buffers early and force nodes to
drop messages. Most messages are dropped before reach-
ing to its destination, but the ones that are not dropped ar-
rive fast. MaxProp, also a flooding-based protocol, obtains
a low latency and a good delivery ratio because of its better
dropping policy based on probabilities of delivery. BS&W
has a replication-based approach that limits flooding and
performs a sort of depth-spread. BS&W performs similar
to MaxProp in terms of latency, but obtain a medium de-
livery ratio because of its lack of a dropping policy that
avoids dropping messages near their destination. Finally,
PrivHab+ obtains the highest delivery ratio thanks to the
quality of its decision making. PrivHab+ takes the best
decisions because it is the only one that takes into ac-
count both the location of the destination and the mobil-
ity patterns of the neighbours. Even with the drawback
of using a single-copy forwarding policy, PrivHab+’s ob-
tains a very low latency that is only slightly improved by
flooding-based protocols that obtain lower delivery ratios.
Protocol
Dropped
Overhead
Aborted
Hops
messages relays
Epidemic 197, 030 964.66% 114, 380 26, 67
Prophet 130, 647 855.96% 382, 557 13, 95
Maxprop 9, 929 65.91% 252, 023 11, 21
BS&W 33, 373 36.66% 114, 380 9, 50
Random 396 112.40% 375, 200 180, 13
First
75 46.73% 217, 280 59, 54
Contact
PrivHab+ 128 9.68% 51, 343 8, 46
Table 11: Obtained results in terms of network overhead, amount of
dropped messages, aborted relays and hops performed by the deliv-
ered messages. Single-copy protocols like PrivHab+ and First Con-
tact are the ones that waste fewer network resources.
Table 11 shows the average number of aborted relays,
dropped messages, hops performed by the delivered mes-
sages, and the network overhead (calculated as the relation
between the number of the relays done and the number of
delivered messages). A low network overhead is desirable
in scenarios where the resources are constrained. Reduc-
ing the number of relays saves battery and increases the
amount of time nodes are operational, improving this way
the performance of the whole network.
Epidemic and Prophet generate an enormous overhead
of around one thousand percent that means that almost
all nodes effort while forwarding messages is wasted, be-
cause the forwarded messages will probably be dropped
before being delivered to their destination. Besides, Epi-
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Figure 15: Obtained results in terms of latency and delivery ratio in the Gwanda scenario. PrivHab+ and MaxProp perform far better than
the rest, obtaining a low latency and a high delivery ratio.
demic force messages to pass through a high number of
intermediate hops after arriving its destination, causing
a higher latency. MaxProp and Binary Spray & Wait
(BS&W) generate a smaller amount of dropped messages
and a lesser network overhead. These two protocols try
to compensate their poor decision making by generating
copies. Creating copies fills the buffers and consumes a lot
of energy, but these two protocols create copies in a clever
way than Epidemic and Prophet, consume fewer resources
and need a lesser number of hops to obtain better results.
Between them, MaxProp better delivery ratio can be ex-
plained because it spreads messages in a more equitable
way through the network than BS&W. Note that Max-
Prop manages to drop less than a half of messages than
BS&W and needs almost two average hops less to reach
each message’s destination. Random and First Contact
reduce highly the amount of messages dropped because do
not flood the network with copies. However, their net-
work overhead is also high because the majority of their
relays are bad choices. Note that their number of hops and
aborted relays is really high because messages spend a lot
of time being relayed to nodes that will not approach them
to its destination. Finally, PrivHab+ generates the small-
est amount of dropped messages and the lowest network
overhead because PrivHab+’s routing decisions are much
better than the decisions taken by all other protocols.
7.6. Simulations: Gwanda
Results obtained on the second scenario are shown in
Figure 15, where the performance of all the compared pro-
tocols in terms of delivery ratio and latency is depicted. In
comparison with the results of Figure 14 of the previous
scenario, we can identify three main differences.
The first difference is that latencies obtained by all
protocols are around a 50% lower. The reason is that
physical distances in the Gwanda scenario are smaller. As
a consequence, messages have to spend less time being
carried by a node from one village to another.
The second difference is that two flooding-based pro-
tocols as Epidemic and Prophet, that ranked 3rd and 4th
in the Cajamarca scenario in terms of latency, perform a
little worse in this scenario. Both protocols are unable
to tell the not useful relays apart from the useful ones.
For this reason, they are harmed by the higher amount of
nodes that are not useful to deliver messages to certain
destinations. PrivHab+’s ability to identify useful relays
through the comparison of habitats has benefited from this
circumstance to obtain a lower latency (ranking 3rd).
Finally, the third difference is the lower delivery ra-
tio of First Contact, Random and BS&W. The density
of nodes is higher, so First Contact and Random have
to make more routing decisions, and they usually make
the wrong one. BS&W decreased delivery ratio is a con-
sequence of the big share of created copies that are for-
warded to the higher amount of not useful nodes. The
rest of the results obtained are similar between the two
scenarios. PrivHab+ low latency is only slightly improved
by replication-based protocols like BS&W and MaxProp.
However, in terms of delivery ratio, PrivHab+ greatly out-
performs all other compared protocols, specially Epidemic,
BS&W and Prophet.
Table 13 shows the average number of aborted relays,
dropped messages, hops performed by the delivered mes-
sages, and the network overhead introduced by each proto-
col. As in the Cajamarca scenario, Epidemic and Prophet
generate an enormous overhead. This means that almost
all nodes effort while forwarding messages is wasted, be-
cause most of the forwarded messages are dropped before
being delivered to their destination. The decreased effi-
ciency of BS&W in this scenario is reflected in the intro-
duced network overhead and in the number of hops. In this
scenario, both values are higher than MaxProp’s. Note
that MaxProp’s number of hops is the smallest one, but
its delivery ratio it’s not the best. The reason is that some-
times MaxProp does not forward messages to nodes with
low probabilities of encounter (because they never met the
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Protocol PrivHab+ MaxProp BS&W Prophet Epidemic
First
Random
Contact
Delivery ratio Very high High Low Very low Very low Medium Low
Latency Low Very low Very low Low Medium High Very high
Network overhead Very low Medium Medium Very high Very high Low Medium
Nodes’ privacy Protected Violated
Not
Violated
Not Not Not
considered considered considered considered
Protocol’s complexity Constant Linear Constant Linear Constant Constant Constant
Suitability to reach
High High Low Very low Very low Medium Very low
hop-distant destinations
Table 12: Feature comparison of all the routing protocols. MaxProp and PrivHab+ have the best performance marks, but PrivHab+, with
less overhead, privacy respectful and a constant complexity instead of a linear one, has a set of characteristics that make it better in scenarios
like the two we have studied.
Protocol
Dropped
Overhead
Aborted
Hops
messages relays
Epidemic 249, 740 1089.53% 486, 253 18, 57
Prophet 156, 716 957.98% 453, 219 9, 85
Maxprop 15, 910 86.69% 322, 832 6, 35
BS&W 37, 927 101.50% 122, 217 13, 46
Random 939 191.910% 324, 955 149, 21
First
692 62.06% 168, 085 41, 45
Contact
PrivHab+ 82 8.51% 43, 839 7, 41
Table 13: Obtained results in terms of network overhead, amount of
dropped messages, aborted relays and hops performed by the deliv-
ered messages. Single-copy protocols like PrivHab+ and First Con-
tact are the ones that waste fewer network resources.
destination before) that are good choices because of their
habitats. PrivHab+ recognize this nodes and use them
to carry the messages, and this way it achieves a higher
delivery ratio. Random and First Contact drop a small
amount of messages because they do not flood the net-
work with copies, but their overhead and number of hops
are also high because the majority of their relays are bad
choices. Finally, PrivHab+ generates the smallest amount
of dropped messages and the lowest network overhead be-
cause PrivHab+’s routing decisions are much better than
the decisions taken by all other protocols.
The small network overhead produced by PrivHab+
could allow users to use the same devices to run other
applications like e-mail, voice messaging, blog-style pub-
lications, etc. Note that, being PrivHab+ the protocol
with the higher computational overhead (5.5s), it is also
the one with the lowest amount of aborted relays. In fact,
PrivHab+ takes better routing decisions. This reduces the
total number of relays needed to deliver a message to its
destination and the time that messages last in the network.
As a consequence, nodes carry less messages and can for-
ward all of them before the opportunistic contacts end.
Therefore, we can state that the computational and com-
munication overhead introduced by PrivHab+ is perfectly
assumable because it is compensated by its better decision
making, improving the performance of the network.
7.7. Qualitative comparison
Table 12 summarizes the whole comparison between
all protocols. In addition to those already mentioned, de-
livery ratio, latency and network overhead; we also take
into consideration nodes’ privacy, the protocol’s complex-
ity, and the suitability to reach hop-distant destinations.
Delivery ratio, latency and network overhead are the main
performance indicators of a routing protocol. The impor-
tance of privacy has been discussed before. The protocol’s
complexity could be important while using small devices
and the number of nodes in the network grows. The suit-
ability to reach hop-distant destinations is a capital aspect
in scenarios where messages have to be forwarded many
times due to the long distances between the source and
the destination.
Nodes’ privacy is protected by PrivHab+, which is the
only one that uses private information in a secure manner.
Privacy is obviously not considered by the protocols that
do not use node-related information to make choices. Be-
sides, it is heavily violated by Prophet and MaxProp while
nodes exchange their likelihood to contact others without
protecting it. Furthermore, security of these two proto-
cols cannot be easily enhanced, because they need to flood
the network with a private information that is the basis of
their operation.
The complexity of PrivHab+, BS&W, Epidemic, First
Contact and Random is constant. These protocols need
to perform always the same amount of operations to make
a routing decision. MaxProp and Prophet need to update
and compare an amount of probabilities that grow linear
with the number of nodes of the network. When operating
in networks with lots of nodes, both probabilistic protocols
have to limit the amount of encounter probabilities they
store, decreasing this way their performance.
Finally, in big scenarios where destinations are dis-
tant and messages have to be carried by many nodes,
flooding-based protocols become poor routing protocols
because they tend to congest the nodes that are nearest
to the origin. This is what happens with Prophet and
Epidemic. BS&W is slightly better because it avoids cre-
ating all the copies near the source node. First Contact
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is better than Random because, eventually, the message
moves away from the origin, but both does it slowly any-
way. The transitiveness of probabilities makes MaxProp
perform well in this circumstance. However, as nodes that
are far away in terms of hops are very likely to be far
away too in terms of geographic distance, PrivHab+ is
the most suitable routing protocol for delivering messages
to hop-distant destinations because it is designed to make
messages travel distances towards their destination.
PrivHab+ decision making is based on the comparison
of habitats. For this reason, it requires the scenario to be
big enough to benefit from a geographic routing approach,
and it is only useful when the movement patterns of the
nodes constitute some kind of routine. When this happens,
this decision making allows PrivHab+ to deliver more mes-
sages to their destination, even when using a single-copy
forwarding policy. Besides, in these scenarios PrivHab+
performs faster than all other protocols except BS&W and
MaxProp and consumes far less network resources. More-
over, it preserves nodes’ privacy and performs really well
when the number of nodes is high and the destinations of
the messages are distant. Finally, PrivHab+ is efficient
enough to be executed in small and cheap devices and the
overhead that introduces is compensated by the quality of
the routing decisions it makes, improving the performance
of the network.
8. Conclusions
We have defined an elliptic model of habitat. The
habitat models node’s whereabouts based on the idea of
exploiting life-cycles. The habitat is useful to compare
the intermediate nodes to decide who is a better choice
to carry each message towards its destination. We have
presented PrivHab+, a secure geographical DTN routing
protocol that uses the habitat to make routing decisions.
PrivHab+ takes advantage of Taxicab geometry and makes
use of homomorphic cryptography techniques to preserve
the privacy of the participants while comparing the habi-
tats of the candidate nodes.
PrivHab+ has been analyzed as a secure multi-party
computation to proof that the protocol is secure. The only
knowledge that can be learned by each participant about
others intimacy is the same that could be inferred from the
output of the protocol. This is an important point that
makes PrivHab+ recommendable to use in scenarios where
nodes are so related, directly or indirectly, to a person that
their privacy needs to be protected.
We have developed a proof-of-concept implementation
that demonstrates that the presented protocol is viable
and that it can be executed on small devices with a good
performance. Both the computation and the communi-
cation overhead introduced by PrivHab+ is proven to be
affordable and to not degrade the performance of the net-
work. Besides, simulations based on two podcast distribu-
tion scenarios have shown that PrivHab+ performs better
than a set of well known DTN routing protocols and min-
imizes the network overhead. The qualitative comparison
between PrivHab+ and the other routing protocols shows
that PrivHab+ is a good choice not only for this two sce-
narios. In fact, PrivHab+ is a good choice in any DTN
scenario where nodes are linked to people, where mobility
patterns are routinary, and where the considered distances
are high, forcing the need of lots of hops to reach each des-
tination.
As future lines of research, we plan to study the im-
pact of different forwarding policies on the performance of
PrivHab+, to improve the elliptic model of habitat using
a more complex representation, that does not have to be
necessarily a geometric figure, and to develop an enhanced
version of PrivHab+ that compares simultaneously three
or more habitats. We also plan to study the performance
of PrivHab+ in different scenarios and to present more real
applications that could benefit from this secure geographic
routing protocol.
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